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RESOLVING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DISPUTES IN
MASSACHUSETTS:
STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL INITIATIVES IN
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

A claim of medical malpractice arises when a person suffers
harm as a result of a physician's negligence.' In some situations, a
deceased patient's survivors may bring a lawsuit against a physician,
hospital, or Health Maintenance Organization for failing to diagnose
a condition sooner.2 Such claims may also arise in the context of
unsuccessful treatment or where a patient is injured due to a surgical
accident.3 Regardless of whether the harm is physical or psychological, temporary or life-long, visible or invisible, all claims boil down
to one factor: whether or not the harm, in the eyes of the law, is considered legally compensable.4 If the harm does not meet this threshold legal requirement, the plaintiffs day in court is brief.5 Therefore, a patient may suffer harm at the hands of a medical professional, yet have nowhere to turn if that harm is deemed uncompensable.6

' See Barbara Hayes Buell, Taking the Sting Out of Litigation with ADR,
21 MASS. LAW. WKLY., Sept. 6, 1993, at S3. Buell argues in favor of using
alternative dispute resolution methods for resolving medical malpractice disputes.
Id.
2 See David D. Benjamin, Mediation: A Better, Faster, Cheaper Way to
Resolve Health Care Disputes?, 25 MASS. LAW. WKLY., May 12, 1997, at B5.
Benjamin compares and contrasts the virtues of alternative dispute resolutionwith
traditional litigation. Id.
' See Sheila M. Johnson, A Medical Malpractice Litigator Proposes
Mediation, 52 J. DisP. RESOL. 42, 45 (Spring, 1997). Johnson describes the
myriad medical outcomes that lead to medical malpractice lawsuits.
4 See id. at 44.
Johnson notes that often times the harm suffered by
aggrieved patients does not meet the legal definition of medical negligence.
' See id. If a medical malpractice plaintiff is unsuccessful in his claim of
physician negligence, there are few other avenues of redress. Id.
6 See id. The only other option for unsuccessful
plantiffs is to lodge a
complaint with the state Board of medicine, which does not result in any
compensation to the plantiff. Id.

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. IV

Part I of this article will analyze the traditional litigation model
for resolving medical malpractice disputes, from both the perspective
of patient and provider, as well as the effects on the judicial system.7
Part II will discuss current statutory and judicial schemes implemented to relieve the burden of upward spiraling caseloads in the
Massachusetts court system, including a description of the various
methods of dispute resolution now available to litigants.8 In Part III,
the author will argue in support of the use of alternative dispute
resolution to resolve medical malpractice disputes as opposed to traditional litigation. 9 This article will conclude with an evaluation of
the success of legal reform in Massachusetts and propose further expansion of ADR services in the public justice system.
I. TRADITIONAL LITIGATION
Consider the following hypothetical situation: a patient undergoes needed surgery during which the surgeon accidentally removes
a healthy structure. In every other respect, the surgery is a success,
but due to the surgical error, the patient must now take medication to
compensate for the removal of the healthy structure. The doctor expects the patient to lead a full, healthy life and from the physician's
point of view, the patient's health is unaffected. Yet, from the patient's perspective, a harm has resulted that cannot be measured empirically. The physician breached the patient's trust when the physician erred during surgery, and the patient now depends on medication for the rest of his life as a result of that error. Not only will the
patient feel angry and betrayed, but he must now struggle to regain
his trust in a physician with whom he has a continuing relationship.
Suspending the issue of informed consent and focusing on the
harm caused to this potential plaintiff, a claim of medical malpractice would probably fail. This is due to the fact that, while it is true
that the physician committed a surgical error, it did not result in any
lasting, measurable harm to the patient. Moreover, even if the harm
in this case did rise to the level of a legally compensable harm, the
next question would be: "How much is it worth?" This raises the
See infra notes 10 through 22 and accompanying text.
8

See infra notes 23 through 97

and accompanying text.

See infra notes 98 through 116 and accompanying

text.
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issue of the difficulty many personal injury plaintiffs face when
seeking an attorney to represent them: an attorney would probably be
unwilling to take on a lawsuit that will not yield a judgment large
enough to cover their costs of litigating the claim, even if liability is
clear. In this case, a jury may find that the physician breached her
duty of care to the patient, but if the harm seems minimal, the award
will result in merely nominal damages. Although the plaintiff had
his day in court, he has also paid a high price for it. His attempt to
litigate this claim will have cost him considerable time, money and
emotional energy. This may be true even if the case eventually settles before trial, for example where such a settlement takes place late
in the pre-trial process, when possibly many months of discovery
and trial preparation have passed.
The average cost of medical malpractice litigation for both parties ranges from approximately twenty-five thousand to forty-five
thousand dollars.'0 As much as a decade may elapse by the time the
trial is concluded." In the meantime, both the plaintiff and defendant suffer the psychological consequences of protracted litigation. 2
From the perspective of physician defendants, the lawsuit represents
a personal attack on their professional ability and reputation. 3 The
'0 See Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Medical Malpractice Disputes;
Imaging the Jury's Shadow, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 54 & 59 n.55
(Winter, 1991). Because attorneys for both plaintiffs and defendants engage in
similar pretrial preparations, it is reasonable to assume relative equality in costs.
See also Thomas B. Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in
Medical Malpractice, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 429, 433. Metzloff notes that although
the majority of medical malpractice lawsuits are settled before trial, these
settlements usually take place "on the courthouse steps," when litigation
expenses have already escalated. Id.
" See Buell, Taking the Sting out of Litigation with ADR, supra note 1, at
S3. Buell discusses the probability of a lengthy process of trial preparation as
one of many drawbacks to traditional litigation. Id.
12 See Allen
K. Hutkin, Resolving the Medical Malpractice Crisis:
Alternatives to Litigation, 4 J.L. & HEALTH 21, 24 [hereinafter Hutkin, Resolving
the Medical MalpracticeCrisis], in which Hutkin describes the emotional toll of
medical malpractice litigation on physicians as a "major life stress". Id.
"3 See Buell, Taking the Sting out of Litigation with ADR, supra note 1, at
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time and energy plaintiffs spend litigating a claim often delays the
emotional closure needed to move forward with their lives. 4 The
financial burden and time delays associated with litigation are felt by
the judicial system as well. 5 Limited judicial resources
also add to
6
the difficulty of expediting cases through the courts.
Plaintiffs litigating a medical malpractice claim face daunting
statistics, exemplified by the fact that the Massachusetts Medical
Professional Insurance Association ("MMPIA") receives approximately twelve hundred medical malpractice claims each year. 7 Of
those twelve hundred complaints, about eight hundred result in no
payment to the complainant. The remainder of the claims are resolved in favor of the physician defendant ninety-three percent of the

S3. Buell presents the financial and emotional impact on the lives of both parties
to the lawsuit, rather than taking a strictly patient-oriented view. Id.
,4See id. at S3, wherein Buell opines that "everyone needs closure [and] ...
the prompt resolution of a medical malpractice lawsuit."
'" See Honorable Peter W. Agnes, Jr., A Reform Agenda for CourtConnected Dispute Resolution in Massachusetts, 40 BOSTON B.J. 4, 5 (Mar./Apr.
1996). Judge Agnes indicated his agreement with public opinion that
Massachusetts' courts are overcrowded. Id. Judge Agnes went on to identify the
two main reasons for this judicial backlog: (1) the complexity of the cases
coming before the courts for resolution, and (2) society's reliance on traditional
litigation as the only means of resolving such cases. Id. at 4.
,6See Mark A. Cohen, Court Leaders Issue Policy Statement on ADR;
Endorse New Dispute Resolution procedures, 22 MASS. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 11,
1993, at 3. Cohen quoted Supreme Judicial Court Chief Justice Paul J. Liacos,
who stated that the Court was committed to serving the needs of all justice
consumers despite "budgetary restrictions". See also David D. Benjamin,
Mediation: A Better, Faster, Cheaper Way to Resolve Health Care Disputes?,
supra note 2 at B5. Benjamin asserts that the discovery process is inhibited by
attorneys who "shop" around for an expert whose opinion will bolster their
argument. Id.
" See Buell, Taking the Sting out of Litigation with ADR, supra note 1, at
S3. Buell notes that the majority of medical malpractice plaintiffs are ultimately
unsuccessful. Id.
' See id. These complainants are left only with the option of filing a
complaint with the state Board of Medicine. Id.
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time.' 9 With the numbers stacked against the prospective plaintiff,
the choice to litigate is a gamble many plaintiffs and their attorneys
may be unwilling to take. ° These statistics account for the relatively
low number of medical malpractice claims actually filed.2 ' In fact,
according to the Harvard Medical Malpractice Study III, less than
two percent of all victims of medical malpractice ever sue their doctors
II. STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL ADR INITIATIVES

In the 1950's, people became more aware of their rights and the
1960's and 1970's witnessed an increase in the number of aggrieved
patients seeking redress in the courts.2 3 As patients began asserting
their rights with increasing frequency, medical malpractice insurance
rates soared. 4 As a consequence of increased insurance rates, physi'9 See id.
20

See Johnson, A Medical Malpractice Litigator Proposes Mediation,

supra note 3, at 45. Johnson stresses that tort reform which caps recoverable
damages acts as a "disincentive for attorneys to represent patients whose injuries
are small or moderate." Id.
21 See Hutkin, Resolving the Medical Malpractice Crisis,
supra note 12, at
25, citing the low number of medical malpractice victims who consult attorneys.
Hutkin based his conclusion on a 1987 study in Maine which revealed that only
7% of those surveyed who had suffered harm at the hands of a medical
professional actually sought legal advice. Id.
22 See A. Russell Localio, J.D., M.P.H., MS., et al., Relation Between
Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence. Results of the
Harvard Medical Malpractice Study III, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 245-51

(1991).
" See Johnson, A Medical Malpractice Litigator Proposes Mediation,

supra note 3, at 44. Johnson explains that increased awareness of patient rights
and growing jury awards created a "medical negligence insurance crisis." Id.
See also Neil D. Schor, Health Care Providers and Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Needed Medicine to Combat Medical Malpractice Claims, 4 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 65, 65 (1988) [hereinafter Schor, Health Care Providers

and ADR]. Schor comments that this increase in insurance premiums also led to
increased costs for health care consumers.
24

See Hutkin, Resolving the Medical MalpracticeCrisis, supra note 12, at
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cians began practicing defensive medicine: the ordering of duplicative or extensive diagnostic services in order to prevent malpractice
claims." As health maintenance organizations (HMOs) take the
place of independent practices, physicians defending malpractice
claims face the added
fear of becoming unemployable or losing hos26
privileges.
pital
Ultimately, state legislatures recognized the need to contain the
ever increasing cost of health care before it grew out of control.27
The most common response in almost every state was the reform of
tort legislation.
In 1986, the Massachusetts Legislature imposed
caps on the maximum amount of damages recoverable by tort vic-

22. Between 1974 and 1984, insurance costs increased by 336% and premiums
for some specialties doubled in only one year. Id.
25 See id. at 25. Hutkin estimates the annual cost of defensive medicine at
three to five billion dollars. Id. Physicians could not afford to make errors, lest
they face costly litigation and increased insurance premiums. Id.
26 See Data Bank Creates Mixed Emotions, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 7,
1990, at 17. This article focuses on effects of implementation of National
Practitioner Data Bank. Id. The National Practitioner Data Bank is a product of
the Health Quality Improvement Act of 1986. Id. Legislators intended to protect
the public from medical malpractice by creating a centralized information
repository of physicians' performance records. Id. The editorial points out that
the legislation would require health care facilities to access the Data Bank when
considering a physician for employment. Id. See also Mark E. Schreiber,
Physicians' Employment Problems and the PractitionerData Bank, 23 MASS.
LAW. WKLY., Nov. 14, 1994, at 37. Schreiber predicts that employers will use

Data Bank information as a "bargaining chip" in negotiations or disputes.
27 See Neil D. Schor, Health Care Providers and ADR, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 65, 65. Schor states that in the 1970's the "health care system [was]
headed ...[for] collapse ... 11d. See also Johnson, supra note 3, at 44, where the
author points out that a majority of states responded to the crisis with tort reform
legislation.
2 See Patricia M. Danzon, The Effects of Tort Reforms on the Frequency
and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 413, 413.
Danzon's article recognizes that tort legislation was undertaken in "virtually
every state." Id.
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tims. 29 It also provided for the offsetting of verdict awards by collateral source payments.3 ° The statute replaced lump sums with structured periodic payments and caps on attorneys' contingency fees.3'
Through tort reform, the legislature hoped to curb the rising cost of
liability insurance and health care services as well as provide some
relief to the overburdened civil court system.32 Much debate centered around the efficacy of such legislation, resulting in widespread
criticism of tort reform.
In Massachusetts, the debate continues to rage on.34 Proponents
argue that Massachusetts is experiencing a "litigation crisis," spurred
on by a "sue or be sued" mentality." As recently as 1995, former
Massachusetts Governor William F. Weld proposed broad changes in
Massachusetts tort law.16 The proposal included, but was not limited
29
30

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (1986).
See id. The purpose of capping damages was to deter claimants and ease

the burden on the court system. Id.
" See id. Offsetting verdict awards by collateral source payments prevents
double recovery by successful plaintiffs. Id.
32 See Thomas P. Hagen, Note, "This May Sting a Little'"--A Solution
to
the Medical Malpractice Crisis Requires Insurers, Doctors, Patients, and
Lawyers to Take Their Medicine, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 147, 154 & 157 (1992)
[Hereinafter "This May Sting a Little']. Hagen reviews proposed federal
responses to the medical malpractice crisis. Id.
33 See Hagen, This May Sting a Little, supra note 32, at 159,
which
describes the disagreement among authorities regarding tort reform's success; see
also Johnson, supra note 3, at 44-45, warning of disincentives caused by award
caps for insurance companies to settle and attorneys to accept cases.
34 See Mark A. Cohen, Bar Steps Forwardto Oppose Weld's Tort-Reform
Proposal.No Need to Overhaul System, Lawyers Say, 24 MASS. LAW. WKLY.,
Mar. 4, 1996, at 1. In this article, Cohen outlines both sides of tort reform
dispute. Id.
" See id. Cohen quotes Kathleen M. O'Donnell, then-President of the
Massachusetts Association of Trial Attorneys, who stated that, in Massachusetts,
a lawsuit is filed every twelve minutes. Id.
36 See Claire Papanastasiou
Rattigan, Weld Unveils Sweeping Legal
'Reform' Plan. Plaintiffs' Bar Vows Offensive to Block Bill, 23 MASS. LAW.
WKLY., July 3, 1995, at 1. Weld referred to Massachusetts as "sue happy" and
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to, instituting the English rule of losers paying winners' attorneys'
fees when settlements were rejected, damage caps, stricter evidentiary standards and sanctions for the filing of "frivolous" lawsuits. 37
Opponents of such legislation, including the Massachusetts Bar Association and the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, accused Weld of trying to align himself politically with business interests through the use of such reform, which would favor businesses,
including insurance companies." In particular, they criticized the
rule requiring the loser to pay the winner's attorneys' fees as increasing the overall costs of litigation.39 They also characterized
damage caps tied to earning capacity as discriminatory and "meanspirited."' Opponents also took issue with Weld's characterization
of a "tort crisis" in Massachusetts, stating that his press release erroneously reported that Massachusetts had one of the highest rates of
tort filings in the United States.'
As early as 1975, the Massachusetts legislature responded to the
medical malpractice crisis through the creation of a medical malpractice claims tribunal.42 Under this enactment, all actions for
medical malpractice must appear before the tribunal, comprised of a

predicted that businesses would suffer without legal reform. Id. at 1.
3" See id. The idea was to curtail the escalating number of lawsuits being
filed in the Commonwealth by raising the bar for plaintiffs to establish a prima
facie case of negligence as well as limiting recoveries. Id.
38 See id. Opponents of the proposed legislation felt that Governor Weld
was merely attempting to gain political support from the business and insurance
sectors while doing little to address the issue of access to the courts for the
citizens of the Commonwealth. Id.
'9 See id. While a "loser pays" rule would certainly help to deter frivolous
suits, it would only have the effect of punishing those sincere plaintiffs with valid
claims who for any number of reasons did not succeed at trial. Id.
40
See id. A verdict should be based on what the factfinder determines to
be the extent of the damages suffered by the plaintiff, not their income level. Id.
4' See Rattigan, supra note 36, at 1. In actuality, the numbers reported
in
the press release reflected the total number of civil filings per 100,000 citizens in
1992, not merely tort filings. Id.
42
See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West 1997). The purpose
of the tribunal is to screen complaints for meritoriousness. Id.
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superior court judge, one attorney and one physician.4 3' The tribunal,
held within fifteen days of the defendant's answer, must determine
whether the plaintiffs offer of proof presents a legally cognizable
cause of action worthy of adjudication."
In reaching a determination, the tribunal may consider all medical records offered as evidence and, in its discretion, may subpoena
45
any such medical records in order to clarify the evidence presented.
If, at the close of the proceeding, the tribunal finds in favor of the
defendant(s), the plaintiff is still free to move forward with a lawsuit.46 The plaintiff must, however, post a six thousand dollar bond
with the court clerk, payable to the defendant(s) in the event that the
plaintiff loses at trial.47 Any witnesses called before the tribunal, as
well as the tribunal's findings, are admissible as evidence in the subsequent trial.48
See id. Both the attorney and physician serving on the tribunal are
chosen by the judge and must be licensed to practice in Massachusetts. Id. The
judge chooses the physician from a list provided by the Massachusetts Medical
Society, of physicians practicing in the same field as where alleged malpractice
occurred. Id. The physicians listed, however, cannot practice in the same county
as the defendant, or where the defendant resides. Id. Where the claim involves
multiple defendants, the judge shall use his or her discretion in choosing the
appropriate representative on the tribunal. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60
B.
, See id. This process weeds out those non-meritorious claims which are
deemed "merely an unfortunate medical result."
Id. See also Barbara
Rabinovitz, State Statute Explains How Tribunal Processes Cases, 22 MASS.
LAW. WKLY., Nov. 22, 1993, at 43, setting forth the general provisions of the
statute.
41 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West
1997). Evidentiary
standards are more relaxed than at trial, and the tribunal is given broad discretion
in allowing documents "in evidence." Id.
46 See id. The finding of the tribunal does not act as an absolute bar to the
subsequent filing of a lawsuit. Id.
41 See id. The bond serves to protect the defendant(s) from having to
pay
for a defense in a lawsuit that was deemed unnecessary by the tribunal. Id.
48 See id. In this way, plaintiffs are "bound"
by the tribunal's findings,
because they are admissible and are usually quite persuasive at trial. Id.
41
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The value of the tribunal lies in its screening function. 49 This
stop-gap measure derails those claims with no legal merit from clogging the already congested docket. ° A major benefit of early elimination is the avoidance of those costs associated with the discovery
process, particularly expert witness fees, which can run very high."
Thus, the medical malpractice claims tribunal represents one successful component of the Commonwealth's response to its judicial
backlog.
The Massachusetts legislature has acknowledged the importance
of early intervention as a means of controlling the flow of cases into
the courts.52 In 1989, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted Massachusetts General Laws chapter 211 B § 19, which grants authority to
the Chief Justice for Administration and Management to establish a
mandatory alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") program for civil
actions.53 Such legislation opens the door for the implementation of
other forms of dispute
resolution, rather than just the traditional
54
litigation.
of
route

See Michael J. Lacek, The Tribunal is Doing Just Fine; Let It Be, 21
MASS. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 22, 1993, at 11. Lacek defends the utility of the
medical malpractice tribunal established by M.G.L. c. 23 1, § 60B. Id.
50 Id. Lacek notes that between the years 1975 and 1992, the tribunals
conducted roughly seven thousand hearings and eliminated sixteen percent, or
eleven hundred claims. Id. Those are cases that, without the tribunal, would
have ended up in court. Id.
", See Lacek, supra note 49, at 11, stressing that the tribunal's disposition
of these claims results in "substantial cost savings."
52 See Barbara E. Stedman, Middlesex Multi-Door Courthouse, 24 MASS.
LAW. WKLY., June 10, 1996, at B2.
Stedman describes the MMDC as a
"screening and ... referral mechanism"Jd.
" See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21 1B § 19. Hence the opportunity for
49

alternative forms of dispute resolution to ease the dockets. Id.
See id.

Disputants' options include case evaluation and management,

negotiation, mediation and arbitration. Id.

See also Barbara Epstein Stedman,

New 'Doors' Open at Middlesex Courthouse, 23 MASS. LAW. WKLY., July 24,
1995, at B4.

This article introduces two more recent "doors" added to the

MMDC: the summary jury trial and arbitration/mediation or "arb/med". Id.
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A prime example of Massachusetts' commitment to improve the
quality of justice is the creation of the Middlesex Multi-Door Courthouse ("MMDC") in Cambridge." Established in 1989, the MMDC
is a court-annexed evaluation program which diagnoses incoming
cases and determines the most appropriate form of dispute resolution.5 6 Like the medical malpractice claims tribunal, the MMDC
uses a screening process; but unlike the tribunal, it also matches the
type of case to the most well-suited resolution mechanism.5 7 The
MMDC screens approximately fourteen hundred cases each year."
Of those cases, roughly five hundred proceed to some form of
ADR.59 An overview of the various ADR mechanisms employed by
the MMDC follows.6°
A.

Mediation

In mediation, a neutral third party works with the disputing parties to guide them in designing a settlement that is mutually desirable.6 ' Unlike a judge, the mediator does not impose a decision upon
the parties, but rather assists them in hammering out their own
agreement. 6' The participants may or may not be assisted by counsel
and, in some mediations, only the representing attorneys participate

" See Stedman, supra note 52, at B2. The Multi-Door Courthouse gives

potential litigants for alternative forms of dispute resolution. Id.
56

See Mark D. Mason, ADR in Massachusetts: The 90's and Beyond, 19

MAss. LAW.

WKLY.,

Sept. 9, 1991, at 33. Mason acknowledges that the MMDC

has evolved into a successful "coordinated approach to dispute resolution." Id.
" See Stedman, supra note 52, at B2. This initial screening process helps
to move the case through the system more efficiently. Id.
"8 See Stedman, supra note 52, at B2.
'9 See id. This last available figures are from 1996. Id.
60 See infra notes 61 through 92 and accompanying text.
61 See American Arbitration Association, Dispute Resolution Programfor
Insurance Claims A Procedural Guide, at 3-4, available in 1991 WL 537127.
This procedural guide provides working definitions of mediation and arbitration
for those who are unfamiliar with alternative dispute resolution terminology. Id.
61

See id. This aspect of "self-determination" increases the likelihood of

participants complying with the final agreement. Id.
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without their clients present.63 Mediators often caucus individually
64
with the parties in private meetings. Caucuses are extremely useful
to the mediator in order to elicit information one party may be unwilling to share with the other party, to foster trust with the mediator, to allow for the diffusion of emotions which can build up during
the mediation and to re-focus the parties on the issue.65 One of the
benefits of mediation reported by participants is the opportunity to
vent their feelings to the opposing party, whereas traditional litiga-66
tion discourages parties from talking directly with one another.
Participants in the mediation process often report a high level of sat61
isfaction because they have power over the final outcome.
B.

Arbitration

Arbitration is an ADR process which may be required under the
terms of a contract, or sought after mutual agreement between the
parties.6 ' Arbitration also involves the use of a neutral third party,
but unlike mediation, the arbitrator renders a decision. 69 While the
arbitrator assumes a judge-like role by determining a "winner" and

63

See

STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION

104 (2d ed.

1992). Professor Goldberg explains the mediation process for the uninitiated. Id.
" See id. at 110. Caucuses are extremely useful, especially where an
exchange becomes heated between the parties, to defuse the tension. Id.
65 See supra note 64 and accompanying
text.
6
See Benjamin, supra note 2, at B5. Benjamin advocates the use of
mediation to resolve health care disputes. Id.
67 See GOLDBERG, supra note 63, at 148-49.
Goldberg postulates that
heightened satisfaction with the process results in greater likelihood of
compliance with final agreement. Id.
66
See Metzloff, supra note 10, at 438-39, describing the basics of
arbitration; Hutkin, supra note 12, at 37. See also Patricia I. Carter, Binding
Arbitration in MalpracticeDisputes: The Right Prescriptionfor HMO Patients?,
18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y, 423, 426 (1997). Carter notes that incorporation
of arbitration agreements into contracts has provided HMOs with a cost-effective
method of resolving disputes. Id.
69 See Hutkin, supra note 12, at 37.
The parties themselves present their
case, but they do not fashion the final agreement. Id.
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"loser," the decision may or may not be final and binding.70 Some of
the benefits of arbitration include quicker resolution as opposed to
litigation, less intimidation compared to the courtroom setting, and
relaxed evidentiary standards.'
C.

Negotiation

Sometimes, disputing parties are able to resolve the matter during the initial screening phase.7 ' Even where parties voluntarily seek
ADR, they are encouraged to try to negotiate among themselves to
bring the matter to a close." Settlements are possible at the initial
screening phase because it is at this point when the parties hear the
reality of their case, realize the strengths and weaknesses of their position, and their chances of prevailing at trial.74
D.

Case Evaluation

Another alternative offered by the MMDC is called "case
evaluation., 75 Similar to arbitration, each party presents their case to
a neutral third party, usually a judge or attorney.76 Each party then
receives an oral evaluation from the neutral third party regarding the

70

See Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines for

Ensuring Fair and Effective Process, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1086, 1088 (1990)
(outlining the basics of the arbitration process).
"' See Stedman, supra note 52, at B2. See also Schor, supra note 27, at 70
(noting some of the advantages of arbitration compared to traditional litigation).
72 See id. At this point, parties get their first realistic look at the odds of
succeeding at trial. Id.
" See id. Once parties are exposed to the realities of the strength of their
case, they are often more willing to discuss settlement. Id.
14 See Hutkin, supra note 12, at 38. See also Ericka
B. Gray, Case Load
Escalates at Middlesex Multi-Door Courthouse, 20 MASS. LAW. WKLY., June 1,
1992, at 38.
" See Ericka B. Gray, Case Load Escalates at Middlesex Multi-Door
Courthouse, 20 MASS. LAW. WKLY., June 1, 1992, at 38.
76 See id. The parties are given a list of possible neutrals from which to
choose. Id.
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merits of the respective cases.77 The parties may then decide whether
to go to trial or select one of the ADR mechanisms. Case evaluation is a valuable tool at the MMDC because
. 79it can persuade stubborn parties to pursue other ADR alternatives.
E. Case Management
The MMDC offers another alternative called "case management."8° Case management is best suited for complex cases, where
the discovery process can consume a long period time of time."' By
providing a structured schedule for the case, the complex case manager helps to keep the case moving, freeing up the court to attend to
other more substantive matters." The role of the case manager is
usually filled by an attorney or retired judge, who may also play a
critical role in facilitating a settlement between the parties.83
F. Summary Jury Trial
A more recent addition to the alternatives available at the
MMDC, the summary jury trial ("SJT"), is unique in that it involves

See id. This presents another opportunity for the parties to entertain
settlement. Id.
7 See id. The prospect of waiting many months before a trial may take
77

place is one of the factors that motivates parties to choose alternative dispute
resolution. Id.
'9See id. Factors such as lengthy pre-trial preparation and costly
discovery also serve to motivate parties to choose alternative dispute resolution.
Id.
80 See Gray, supra note 75, at 38. While in this case
the parties have
chosen to go to trial, case management moves the trial along swiftly and
efficiently. Id.
", See id. Complex cases are well-suited to a structured trial schedule due
to their tendencey for protracted discovery. Id.
2 See id. By setting out a strict schedule of deadlines for completing
discovery, pleadings, etc., cases are prevented from stagnating. Id.
" See id. The case manager keeps the parties on track with their deadlines
and discourages stalling tactics designed to drag the process out. Id.
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the use of jurors.8 4 The process resembles a trial in fast-forward motion, with each party allowed thirty minutes to present their case to
six-person jury. 5 After the jury deliberates and delivers its "verdict," the attorneys for both sides may consult with the jurors to determine what factors influenced their decision.86 SJT is especially
useful in those cases where the disputants are polarized and settlement is unlikely without a "sneak peek" at the possible outcome if
they proceed to a trial.87 Since its inception at the MMDC, the SJT
has received favorable feedback from those who have participated in
the process. 18
G. Mediation/Arbitration("Med-Arb ")
This process blends arbitration and mediation in a way that allows both for direct party involvement in the fashioning of a settlement, and at the same time, provides parties with the security of a
binding agreement.89 In this process, the third party neutral formulates a written binding decision which remains undisclosed to the
parties during the mediation phase. 9° In the event that the parties

See Barbara Epstein Stedman, New Doors open at Middlesex
Courthouse, 23 MASS. LAW. WKLY., July 24, 1995, at B4, describing the two
newest additions to the MMDC.

"' See id. Stedman notes that in SJT, the voir dire process is foregone. Id.
86 See id. Another benefit attributed to the SJT, aside from
the use of
jurors, is the expedited nature of the proceeding; the entire process, from start to
finish, takes about three hours. Id.
17 See id. This abbreviated form of trial helps the disputants
gain realistic
insight into the relative strengths and weaknesses of their case, and how they will
platy out at trial. Id.
" See Stedman, supra note 84, at B4. After polling those who chose SJT,
many participants cited the usefulness of SJT as a means of predetermining the

likelihood of success at trial. Id.
'9 See STEPHEN

B.

GOLDBERG, ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION

226-228 (2d

ed. 1992). The authors note that "a binding resolution isassured in med-arb." Id.
at 227.
90 See id. at 227. Med-arb is sometimes considered to be superior to "pure"
mediation, because it provides for a resolution in the event the parties cannot
reach one themselves. Id.
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reach an impasse and cannot achieve settlement, the written decision
of the arbitrator is imposed upon the parties. 9' Med-Arb is best
suited to simple, straightforward cases which do not involve complex
issues or require a lengthy opinion. 92
The success of the MMDC prompted the call for a state-wide
system of ADR programs in order to facilitate access to ADR for all
citizens.93 In response, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's
Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution issued a policy statement
containing its recommendations for court-connected ADR services
(most recently amended in the summer of 1996). 94 By advocating
the linkage of ADR programs with the courts, the judiciary recognized the value of early intervention as a means of reducing the
caseload of the courts. 95 In so doing, it also laid to rest the long-

9' See id. While this is less preferable than a solution fashioned by the
parties themselves, it does provide closure to the situation and prevents a
protracted lawsuit. Id.
92 See id. at 227-28. The authors are careful to point out that Med-Arb
may be a better alternative for those parties that will walk away after the process,
as opposed to those parties that will have an ongoing relationship, such as
patients and physicians. Id. This is due to the possibility of a binding solution
being imposed on parties reluctant to accept it, and who may harbor bitterness
following such a resolution. Id. at 228.
9' See Mason, supra note 56, at 33 (arguing for a comprehensive ADR
program in order to meet the growing legal needs if the citizenry); Accessible
ADR, 22 MASS. LAW. WKLY., Feb 14, 1994, at 10 (asserting that the "growth of
ad hoc [ADR] programs seems insufficient"). See also Honorable Peter W.
Agnes, Jr., ADR and the Future of the Public Justice System, 21 MASS. LAW.
WKLY., Mar. 8, 1993, at SI. Judge Agnes notes that approximately 75% of the
cases screened at the MMDC proceed to some form of ADR. Id.
94 See Honorable Peter W. Agnes, Jr., ADR and the Future of the Public
Justice System, 21 MASS. LAW. WKLY., Mar. 8, 1993, at Si; SJC Committee
Releases ADR Recommendations, 24 MASS. LAW. WKLY., July 1, 1996, at 19.
Judge Agnes announced that providing ADR services "[is] essential to the basic
mission of the courts." Id.
9' See SIC Committee Releases ADR Recommendations, 24 MASS. LAW.
WKLY., July 1, 1996, at 19. Through the creation of the Multi-Door Courthouse,

disputing parties have "one-stop shopping" for the appropriate forum in which to
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standing perception of the judiciary as unwilling to expand the justice system to include other forms of dispute resolution. 96 Both the
legislative and judicial endorsement of ADR as an effective means of
reducing judicial backlogs as well as costs has paved the way toward
greater accessibility to the justice system for all citizens. 97
III. USING ADR IN THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CONTEXT
The nature of the dispute in a medical malpractice case makes it
especially amenable to the use of ADR.98 Furthermore, litigation
often fails to meet many of the needs of the parties to such lawsuits. 99
This becomes obvious when one examines the dynamics of the patient-physician relationship.
Patients tend to communicate on a

resolve their dispute. Id.
96

See Martin J. Newhouse, Some Reflections on ADR and the Changing

Role of the Courts, 39 BOSTON B.J. 15, 15 & 18 (1995) Newhouse commends the
courts' involvement with and integration of ADR into the public justice system.
Id.
97
See Martin J. Newhouse, Some Reflections on ADR and the Changing
Role of the Courts, supra note 96, at 18. Newhouse enthusiatically endorses the
courts' expansion into alternative dispute resolution. Id.
9' See Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical
Malpractice,9 ALASKA L. REv. 429, 433, listing the advantages of using ADR in
medical malpractice disputes. See also Patricia I. Carter, Binding Arbitration in
malpractice Disputes: The Right Prescription For HMO Patients?, 18 HAMLINE
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 423, 445. Carter discusses the advantages of using arbitration
as opposed to litigation. Id. See also Schor, supra note 27, at 66, arguing that
the use of ADR benefits not only the disputants themselves, but the entire
American health care system.
" Hutkin, supra note 12, at 30-33. Hutkin notes that litigation does not
adequately address many of the issues presented in medical malpractice and
argues that traditional litigation "only addresses the monetary interests of
[litigants]....IId. at 30. See also Johnson, supra note 3, at 43-44. Johnson cites
the Harvard Study, which concluded that less than 2% of medical negligence
victims file suit. Id. Paul Weiler, a researcher in the Harvard Study, opined that
in many cases the compensation received in medical malpractice lawsuits did not
appear to correspond to the magnitude of the injury suffered. Id. at 44.
00. See Hutkin, supra note 12, at 26-28.
The author explains that patients
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more emotional level, especially when they are ill; doctors, however,
are encouraged to avoid this level of communication as a means of
remaining professionally detached.' ' This miscommunication can
lead to misunderstandings that, in turn, can cause conflicts to arise.'O
When patients do not understand their medical condition or why
certain consequences followed from a particular course of treatment,
the potential exists for anger, resentment, and distrust to develop.' 3
Yet, patients often keep these feelings to themselves because they are
either too angry or intimidated to confront their physicians." 4 This
demonstrates the intimate nature of the patient-physician relationship. As it is often said: "effective communication is at the core of
every good relationship"--the patient-physician relationship is no
exception to this rule.' 5
Given that communication is often at the heart of these disputes,
it is obvious why traditional litigation fails to satisfy the needs of the
parties.'06 Someone who feels that they have suffered harm due to a
physician's or hospital's negligence may be seeking more than just
money, yet traditional litigation can offer nothing more to those victims.' ° On the other hand, ADR has proved extremely effective in
often have unrealistic expectations about their physician's ability to treat and
cure. Id.
,oSee id. at 27 (stating that physicians use the "broken machine model" to
filter out irrelevant information coming from the patient and focus on the
symptoms).
102 See id. at 28-29 (referring to this situation as a "clash of perspectives").
103 See id. at 29. Hutkin notes that physicians may think they should spare
their patients complex and often confusing information, whereas patients often
feel "disregarded, ignored, and patronized" when their doctors do not fully
disclose information. Id.
'04 Hutkin, supra note 12, at 29-30. Hutkin states that "As the physicianpatient relationship falters, the attomey-client relationship strengthens." Id.
105
See Johnson, supra note 3, at 49. Johnson discusses the importance of
maintaining a relationship with one's physician, especially in light of the
burgeoning institutionalization of health care. Id.
106 See id. at 30 (stressing that money often inadequately
compensates
plaintiffs for their harm).
,0'
See id. (commenting that plaintiffs seek "reparation, emotional
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this respect.' °8 For example, by using a mediator to facilitate settlement, both parties have the opportunity to express themselves directly to one another.'l 9 The presence of the mediator serves to
"level the playing field," which decreases the anxiety and intimidation patients might ordinarily feel when discussing their discontent
with the physician."
Mediation is by far the most popular form of ADR for resolving
medical malpractice claims."' The mediator helps the parties to understand each other's point of view, allowing for the diffusion of
emotions, which helps them focus on possible solutions." ' The ability to shape their solution provides flexibility and encourages creativity in satisfying the interests of both parties." 3 Another benefit of
mediation is the opportunity for one or both parties to apologize.'"
vindication, and deterrence"). See also Benjamin, supra note 2, at B5. Benjamin
asserts that a money award often fails to adequately compensate med-mal
plaintiffs. Id.
'0' See Johnson, supra note 3, at 49 (proposing mediation for resolving
medical malpractice disputes). Johnson asserts that mediation allows the parties
to discuss the underlying issues of the dispute, which may or may not be related
to liability. Id. In this way, Johnson argues, both patients and physicians have
the opportunity to vent their feelings. Id. See also Benjamin, supra note 2, at
B5.
Benjamin points out that settlement agreements formulated through
mediation address many of the issues in which the dispute is grounded. Id.
'09See Leonard J. Marcus, Case Study Shows Mediation in a Licensure
Dispute, 39 Am. MED. NEWS, Aug. 5, 1996, at 11. This article illustrates a
mediation in action.
"o See id. Marcus points to the lack of relative power on the patient's end
of the patient-physician relationship as one of the reasons that communication
often breaks down between a patient and physician, leading to litigation. Id.
". Buell, supra note 1, at B5. Buell cites the overwhelming majority of
participants in mediation who report satisfaction with the outcome. Id.
"' See id. Buell notes that the presence of a third party neutral helps to
keep the parties on track and focused on solutions, rather than rehashing their
differences. Id.
"' See id. Buell lists some common elements of settlement agreements,
such as apologies, charitable donations, and continuing education. Id.
"14 See id. Buell implies that the power of apology
to resolve many disputes
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The power of apology is frequently overlooked and discouraged in
traditional litigation, where it is construed as an admission of liability. "5 Yet, this simple gesture has a profound impact upon a plaintiff
and often goes a long way toward reaching a settlement."16
IV. CONCLUSION
This brief discussion of mediation illustrates the value of alternatives to medical malpractice litigation. In addition to the benefits
and flexibility afforded by the use of ADR in this context, it also
presents a viable alternative for those unable to afford traditional
litigation. ADR serves to provide an opportunity to be heard for
those whose complaints might otherwise be deemed to lack legal
merit. As a result, both patients and health care providers will benefit because the time, expense and emotional energy consumed by the
trial process will be saved. Furthermore, the patient-physician relationship will benefit from the existence of alternatives to litigation.
Patients will feel more comfortable and confident knowing that an
appropriate forum exists in which to air their complaints. Health care
providers will feel less threatened by the prospect of litigation and,
as a result, will not feel compelled to practice medicine defensively.
This is especially true where ADR is provided for in the terms of the
contract between patient and provider. Attorneys also benefit form
the use of ADR because they will have more options to offer their
clients. Thus, they will better serve both their clients and the community at large, which will strengthen the community's confidence
in the justice system overall and reflect favorably upon the legal profession.
Through the implementation of the Medical Malpractice Claims
Tribunal and the ever-expanding Multi-Door Courthouse, Massachusetts continues to fulfill its commitment to providing a more comis under-recognized. Id.
"' See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES, 32 (2d ed. 1991).
Fisher and Ury provide a practical guide for improving one's communicative and
negotiating skills to facilitate settlement of disputes. Id.
116 See id.
Again, the authors here recognize the importance of simple
courteous gestures as a means of perhaps not fully resolving a dispute, but
helping to soothe egos and civilize the resolution process. Id.
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plete package of justice services to its citizenry. The appropriateness
of ADR in the medical malpractice context further serves to alleviate
the distrust and acrimony often expressed by medical professionals
toward the legal profession. Finally, the ultimate beneficiary is
every health care consumer, who now has greater access to the judicial system; a system better equipped to meet their needs.
Kelly K Meadows

